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Flight Crew Automation 
FORUM 
THE FLIGHT CRE WAND AUTOMATION 
Bernard Antonovich 
"Automation is the allocation of functions to machines that would otherwise be allocated to humans" (Funk 
et al, 1999). Automation on the flight deck has continued to grow throughout the years, with each new generation of 
air transport aircraft containing more automation than the last. As flight deck automation progresses at an increasingly 
rapid rate, the interaction between the pilot and automation will become increasingly more complex. These advances 
in automation have helped to greatly improve the utility of aircraft, allowing them to do things once thought 
impossible, such as landing in zero-zero conditions, near fill-automated take-of&, and optimizing he1 efficiency. 
Flight deck automation has brought improvements to the flight deck, but it has also increased the potential for e m  
in the essential interactions between the automated systems and the human flight crew. The main concern regarding 
automation on the flight deck is the flight crew losing situational awareness. Other concerns include: loss of manual 
skill, overconfidence in automation, and difficulty in predicting and monitoring what the automation is doing or will 
do. There exists a real need to eliminate or mitigate these problems, which pose a significant threat to safety. 
Automation has helped to make air travel safer and 
improvements have been seen, however as Major Wesley A. 
Olson (2001, p. 7) notes, "while the overall rate of aviation 
accidents has declined dramatically over the last 30 years, 
little improvement has been seen over the last 15 years 
despite the continued evolution and improvement of 
automated cockpit systems." Automation alone can go only 
so far, improving upon the interactions between automation 
and the human flight crew is a must for continued 
improvements upon safety and utility. 
The main concern with regards to automation on 
the flight deck is the loss of situational awareness on the 
side of the human flight crew. Such a loss of situational 
awareness poses a real threat to safety, and there are a 
multitude of accident reports that demonstrate the threat. A 
number of studies have noted that the human flight crew is 
at a greater risk to lose situational awareness as the amount 
of automation increases. It has been cited by Mica R. 
Endsley (1996, p. 4) that "the increased display complexity 
and computerized display format reduces the perceptual 
salience of information, even if it is available." The claim is 
m e r  supported by Olson (200 1, p. 13) who stated that "in 
the absence of salient indications (i.e., Dashing lights, color 
changes, etc.), pilots often do not pay attention to potentially 
relevant information." Thus, the way the information is 
presented to the crew and the salience of that information is 
a contributing W o r  to a loss of situational awareness on the 
part of the flight crew. Making the information available 
does not suffice; the information must utilize salient 
indications to draw the attention of the flight crew. Without 
doing so the crew is likely to overlook or miss important or 
critical information. Further, automation has caused the 
flight crew to go h m  an active role on the night deck to a 
passive role. As such, it has removed the flight crew fiom 
the loop, and made them more passive decision makers than 
they were prior to these advanced automated systems. 
Endsley (1996, p. 3) found that in a study dealing with 
automated automobiles, "subjects' situation awareness was 
lower under fully automated and semi-automated conditions 
than under manual performance in an automobile navigation 
task." A similar problem arises with automation on the flight 
deck. The study showed how automation can negatively 
impact a human operator's situational awareness. 
A contributing factor for the loss of situational 
awareness due to automation is in the feedback given to the 
flight crew, which they would receive normally in aircraft 
with little to no automation. The effects of this lack of 
feedback traditionally found in aircraft can be seen through 
'Yhe development of electronic fly-by wire flight 
controls in the F-16 [which] led to problems in 
determining airspeed and maintain[ing] proper 
flight control, as the vibration information that 
usually came through the night stick was suddenly 
missing (even though the needed information was 
clearly indicated on traditional visual displays)." 
(qtd. in Endsley, 1996, p. 4) 
Even though the information was present, the lack of the 
normal non-flyby wire tactile information led to a loss of 
situational awareness among the pilots of the F-16. The 
problem has been corrected with the addition of artificial 
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vibrations on the flight stick, which provide the pilot with 
the tactile sensations they would normally feel. 
Loss of situational awareness has also been 
contributed to information overload and is cited by Olson 
(2001, p. 13) as having to do with "automated 
systems.. .present[ing] more information than the pilot can 
process in the time available." This means that even if the 
information is available to the flight crew they may not be 
able to pick it out among the overload of information they 
are receiving in a limited space of time. The human flight 
crew must be able to sort through the various information to 
pick out what is relevant and what is not. With an overload 
of information, the flight crew is unable to sort through the 
information in a timely and efficient manner, leading to 
midonned or semi-informed decision making. Allowing 
the flight crew easy access to the raw data, which they are 
used to seeing on non-automated aircraft, may help to 
alleviate this problem of information overload. 
Proper crew-machine interaction is essential to 
maintaining situational awareness and a safe and efficient 
flight. There are, however, components in the automation 
that block effective interaction. Johan Rigndr and Sidney 
Dekker (2000, p. 2) state that this interaction may be 
blocked "because pilots can direct the automation 
privately.. .the automation is silent about what it does to the 
aircraft, and because interactions with the computers often 
occur when there is also a lot of other work to do." Rigndr 
and Dekker (2000, p. 2) go on to address the need for a 
change in training because the training "leaves few 
opportunities for aircrews to learn about the broader and 
[sic] more subtle influences of automation.. .and on the need 
to coordinate despite of flight deck designs.. .that routinely 
conspire against the ability to coordinate." If training were 
to effectively allow flight crews to analyze the influences of 
automation and the changes in the role of the flight crew, 
they may be better prepared to deal with some of the 
problems associated with automation and maintain a greater 
situational awareness throughout the flight. 
Along with improving flight crew training mother 
concern that has been raised with the increased use of 
automation is the potential for a loss of manual skill. A 
study concerning the manual skill between airline pilots who 
flew primarily "steam" gauges and those who flew the 
automated glass cockpit was conducted to see if automation 
caused pilots to lose manual skill. A number of obse~ations 
were made: "when given close crossing restrictions, the 
steam gauge crews were more adept at the mental math and 
usually maneuvered the aircraft in a smoother manner to 
make the restriction. On the other hand, the glass cockpit 
crews tended to go 'heads down' and tried to solve the 
crossing restriction on the FMS" (Veillette, 2006). When the 
flight crew goes heads down, they are unable to fly the 
aircraft as effectively, proven fiuther by the fact that "many 
of the glass cockpit crews mismanaged their time trying to 
figure out how to insert the crossing restriction in the box, 
becoming so absorbed in the process that they'd barely make 
the assignment" (Veillette, 2006). The glass cockpit flight 
crews have a tendency to go heads down when they get a 
change to their clearance instead of flying the aircraft. Not 
only does this affect their ability to fly the aircraft if the 
automation fails, it also negatively impacts their situational 
awareness. By directing attention away fiom the flight and 
to the Flight Management System, they are diverting 
attention from important information about the flight and 
from their objective, whether that is a crossing restriction or 
a different instruction given by air traffic control. Not only 
may this lead to not meeting the clearance, it can also 
compromise safety. 
Evidence exists to suggest that as the flight crew 
becomes increasingly accustomed to the everyday, repetitive 
use of automation, they begin to put increasing confidence 
into that automation. The overuse of automation, in tum, 
may lead to the flight crew becoming overconfident in the 
automation system that their aircraft is equipped with. 
According to Ken Funk et a1 (2007), "pilots may become 
complacent because they are overconfident in and uncritical 
of automation, and fail to exercise appropriate vigilance, 
sometimes to the extent of abdicating responsibility to it. 
This can lead to unsafe conditions." The claim has been 
supported by a number of accident and incident 
investigations, such as the investigation by the Investigation 
Commission of Ministry of Transport in their 1989 report, 
where it was cited on page 60 that 'Yhe A320 has new 
features which may have inspired some overconfidence in 
the mind of the Captain." Here is a prime example how 
overconfidence in the capabilities of advanced automated 
systems can lead the flight crew into let their guard down 
and lose their situational awareness leading to a compromise 
in safety. 
In regards to automation and the subsequent loss of 
situational awareness in the cockpit, a further concern is in 
the flight crew having difficulty predicting what the 
automation will do. The reason for difficulty in predicting 
what automation will do is due in'part to what form of 
feedback the automated system gives to the flight crew. As 
stated by Olson (2001, p. 18), "automated systems often 
lack the ability to clarify ambiguous or misunderstood 
instructions," which can lead to the aircraft and automated 
systems not performing the functions the flight crew had 
intended the automation to perform, leading the flight crew 
to be surprised by the resulting actions taken by the 
automated systems. There are a number of reasons why the 
flight crew may be surprised by, or unable to predict, the 
actions of the automated systems. Inability to predict the 
actions, or being surprised by the actions, of the automated 
system may be explained by Guy A. Boy and P. Carlo 
Cacciabue (1997, p. 4), who stated, "automation was 
implemented fkom an engineering perspective rather than 
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fiom a human operator perspective." Since automation was 
not implemented from a human operator perspective, it 
could provide at least a partial explanation as to why the 
flight crew is surprised by actions taken by the automation 
and at times unable to predict what it will do. Boy goes on 
to make an astute observation that "automation should be 
driven by actual needs rather than by technological optionsyy 
(Boy & Cacciabue, 1997, p. 7). If automation was driven by 
needs, it might help to mitigate the loss of situational 
awareness, and help the flight crew to better predict what 
actions the automation will take. Either way, including flight 
crews in the design of automated systems may help to 
reduce these problems. 
In conclusion, the need to mitigate or eliminate the 
loss of situational awareness that occurs as automation 
advances is real. It has been documented that with the ever- 
advancing levels of automation, flight crews can and do lose 
situational awareness, and without hand-flying, pilots will 
lose effectiveness when dealing with situations where the 
automation has failed. Possible ways to help mitigate or 
eliminate this loss of situational awareness include: 
introducing automation earlier in training, allowing flight 
crews input on the design, functions, and displays of the 
automated system, as well as designing automation from a 
human perspective as opposed to an engineering one. 
Further, allowing the flight crew easy access to the raw data, 
which is normally present, may help alleviate the problems 
in interaction which face the human flight crew. Utilizing 
automation to augment the human flight crew and provide 
them with the information and performance they need or 
request in a timely, efficient, and presentable manner may 
increase their situational awareness by giving them the best 
of both worlds. Also, having flight crews routinely and 
systematically hand-fly the airad3 will aid in keeping the 
crew keen in both the use of automation and in managing 
the flight should that automation fail. There are a multitude 
of ways to improve on automated systems; these are but a 
few potential solutions which can help to improve these 
essential systems. Automation is here now, and will remain 
here. It has allowed us to gain more utilization of aircraft in 
a more efficient manner. As such, improving on the human- 
machine interaction and keeping the flight crew aware of the 
situation and in the loop at all times, and making the 
automated systems an effective crew partner, is a must.+ 
Bernard G. Antonovich is currently a senior at Daniel Webster College. He presently holds a commercial pilot certificate with 
an airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument rating. He is also actively pursuing a flight instructor certificate. 
He is expected to graduate in May 2008 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aviation Flight Operations. 
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